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Abstract. Achieving compliance with legal regulations is no easy task.
Normally, laws state general requirements but do not provide clear pa-
rameters to determine when such requirements are met. On a different
level, industrial standards and best practices define specific objectives
that can be certified by means of auditing procedures from qualified
bodies. Implementing a standard does not per se guarantee legal com-
pliance, with the rare exception when the standard is also endorsed by
the law itself. But standards and laws in the same domain may have
overlaps and correlations, so adopting the former may provide an argu-
ment to demonstrate that adequate measures were taken to achieve legal
compliance. In this paper, we introduce a framework that, using state-
of-the-art Natural Language Semantics techniques, helps process legal
documents and standards to build a knowledge base to store their logic
representations, and the correlations between them. The knowledge base
will help legal experts assess what requirements of the law are met by the
standard and, consequently, recognize what requirements still need to be
implemented to fill the remaining gaps. An application of the framework
is exemplified by comparing a provision of the European General Data
Protection Regulation against the ISO/IEC 27001:2013 standard.
Keywords: Legal compliance; legal requirements; security standards;
General Data Protection Regulation.
1 Introduction
Security standards have contributed to shaping the quality of services and have
promoted a security-oriented culture by establishing best practices. Like stan-
dards in general, they can also create in favour of the implementing party a
“presumption of conformity with the specific legal provision they address” [12].
In themselves, standards do not guarantee legal compliance. In order to have
a direct effect on legal compliance, standards would need to be endorsed by gov-
ernments as key elements in their framework for policies and regulations. This is
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a solution that ISO and IEC are advocating in specific sectors, such as that Med-
ical Device1, but it would have severe limitations if applied at an international
level. In the European Union, for instance, where there is the need to promote a
single market while letting each country establish its own legal framework, sup-
porting a standard in a legislative source (Regulation or Directive alike) would
immediately exclude from conformity the countries where that standard is not
commonly adopted, weakening their position in the single market [10]. This is
why the European Union prefers to emit a legislation that defines an abstract
level of safety/security of products and systems, and makes the adoption of
standards to demonstrate compliance a voluntary choice2.
That stated, standards nevertheless remain a viable way to support argu-
ments for conformity with regulations. When widely adopted and subject to
repeated audits by conformity-assessing bodies, a standard can give an organiza-
tion that implements it an argument of compliance. Of course, such an argument
is a presumption, giving the possibility to demonstrate that the organization
failed to comply with the legal framework [12]. Still, this can offer an inversion
of the burden of proof that the organization would not benefit from, if it simply
adopted a personalized solution.
However, that argument of compliance needs to be reassessed when new laws
reshape the legal landscape. In this case, a company needs to know whether
or not the standards it has adopted will preserve the company’s argument of
conformity. Failing that, it may want to know what changes must be implemented
to keep preserving that argument. Waiting for the adoption of new standards
would take a significant amount of time and may lead to interim problems. In
the meanwhile, businesses face the risk of liability for not being compliant and
may, on that ground, be sanctioned. A passive business strategy like this may
have the benefit of being effortless but can backfire with high costs if an incident
occurs.
A safer strategy would be to identify what provisions in a standard interpret
or implement the provisions in the law. This allows to determine what gaps
need to be filled in order to benefit from the argument of compliance. Such
correlations can express either a formal compliance based on the semantic of
terms of the language in the standard and the law, or a substantive compliance
based on decisions of courts and other competent authorities. This strategy has
drawbacks as well: security standards, laws, and court decisions are written in
natural language. Reading and analysing them by hand is inefficient and largely
impractical. But this activity can be supported by computer processing.
We advocate such a pathway and propose a software framework that aids
in determining the formal and substantive correlations between provisions in a
standard and in a law. The framework’s core is a logic-based methodology to
represent, in a machine-processable format, (a) the relevant syntactical concepts
in the provisions, and (b) the relevant correlations between them. In this paper,
1 See for example http://www.iso.org/sites/policy/sectorial_examples.html.
2 Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 October 2012 on European Standardization, Article 2.1
we describe in detail this logic-based methodology, and exemplify how it works
using an excerpt from the ISO/IEC 27001 security standard and a provision in
the new European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)3.
The framework depends on two auxiliary functional blocks (see Section 2):
1. a logic knowledge base that stores the history of the machine-processable
logic correlations, based on collaborative work; experts can not only use the
knowledge base but also correct and extend it;
2. a set of Natural Language Semantics (NLS) and Natural Language Processing
(NLP) techniques that allow a user to browse a XML representation of the
documents, search and retrieve the words, terms, and phrases that he and
others have found relevant for correlation.
The NLS and NLP techniques will help users show the established correlations
within the knowledge base. Any expert user can contribute to reinforce, correct,
justify, and expand the correlations. Due to differences in legal interpretation, it
may happen that some of the correlations will be in contradiction. Initially, these
will remain as contradictions within the knowledge base; over time however they
will be overridden by interpretations from more authoritative sources (such as
those given by courts of a higher instance).
Technically, the different correlations are expressed in a deontic and defeasible
logic for legal semantics called Reified Input/Output Logic (see Section 3), while
the modus operandi of the framework is similar to that of the collaborative
tools for document translation “SDL Trados Studio”. It must be stressed that
selecting the relevant terms and establishing the correlations is an activity that
still requires human reading, processing and decision-making. The analysis of
documents is therefore semi-automatic. It will be supported by the extensible
knowledge base; the process of browsing, aided by the tools and techniques from
the NLS and NLP, adds efficiency and precision.
The fast pace of technological innovation calls for new regulation. The Eu-
ropean Union (EU)’s GDPR is the perfect example of a new legislation which
is trying to address the challenges posed by new technologies. It will be applied
from 25 May 20184, and it poses significant challenges for undertakings in terms
of ensuring compliance with it, as it brings significant changes to the regulatory
framework for personal data protection in Europe. Security standards, on the
other hand, can be regarded as a building block [12] that helps data-processing
organizations comply with the principle of accountability and with their obli-
gations resulting from data protection laws. Considering the novelties of the
GDPR, as well as the partial overlap between security and data protection, this
article will illustrate a methodology based on the correlations between provisions
of the GDPR and security standards, specifically ISO/IEC 27001.
3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation).
4 GDPR, Article 99.2.
2 The framework at a glance
The framework we propose is schematically summarized in Figure 1. Users (who
may be lawyers, regulators, auditors, or other legal experts), access a digital and
annotated XML representation of the normative texts (both laws and standards).
While browsing a document and selecting the relevant concepts—some which
may have been previously annotated—NLP and NLS tools help traverse the rest
of the documents, find related terms, and recall the correlations that already exist
between them. Not all these correlations have the same degree of importance,
as they come from different sources and may have different relevance in specific
contexts. This subsidiary information will be stored in appropriate metadata.
Potential contradictions and ambiguities among the different interpretations can
be solved, as detailed in Section 4. Besides, the user can find new terms and define
new correlations, or correct existing ones. The framework thus implements a
collaborative, self-correcting, strategy to evaluate the stored correlations. The
user’s decisions are stored in the knowledge base for later use, after having
been appropriately represented in a logic for legal semantics. The details of this
transformation are also explained in Section 4.
Fig. 1. The framework at a glance.
Our framework offers a computer-aided methodology to anyone who intends
to analyze standards to build an argument of compliance with respect to a spe-
cific piece of legal text. The framework, and in particular its knowledge base,
does not pretend to be complete. Rather, it provides the expert user with the
updated knowledge that helps him or her take autonomous and informed deci-
sions, either when confirming the correlations the tool suggests or when choosing
to define new correlations.
The knowledge base is designed to tolerate apparent inconsistencies of dif-
ferent interpretations of terms which may lead to different correlations and cre-
ate conflicts. Conflicts are especially frequent in legal interpretation, but can
be solved, at least in principle, considering that the interpretations of higher
instances, such as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), prevail
over others. In order to cope with interpretations of different legal weights, which
may supersede one another, the logic formalism that the framework embeds is
defeasible: correlations can be updated, modified, rewritten and weighted. If, de-
spite the defeasible mechanism, conflicts do remain, the framework still embeds
known strategies that help the user take a decision (see Section 4).
In the following, this paper will exemplify the core part of the methodology,
which relates to building correlations.
3 Background
The background is structured along two main topics. 1) Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP) [22,8] and Natural Language Semantics (NLS) [15,20]) in le-
gal analysis, techniques which we invoke in the computer-assisted steps of our
methodology. 2) Reified Input/Output Logic, the defeasible logic that we pro-
pose as the formal language to express correlations.
Natural Languages Processing in Law. The application of NLP and NLS to the
legal domain is a research trend that has received a lot of attention and invest-
ments in recent years, as demonstrated by the several EU funded projects on
the topic such as Openlaws5, Legivoc6, EUCases7, ProLeMAS8, BO-ECLI9, and
MIREL10. Modern NLP technologies [5] are able to classify and discover inter-
links between legal documents thanks to parsers [2], statistical algorithms [7],
and legal terminological databases or legal ontologies [23,7]. This is often done by
transforming the legal documents into XML standards, such as Akoma Ntoso11,
where relevant information are tagged. An example of commercial legal doc-
ument management system employing these technologies is Eurocases12 which
collects EU case law and uses NLP techniques to classify the documents on the
basis of their topic [6].
Although these systems help navigate legislative documents and retrieve in-
formation, their overall usefulness is limited because they process words dis-
regarding their possible different semantic interpretations. The latter would
allow for legal reasoning, e.g., correlating laws among them and determining
whether they lead to inconsistencies. Semantic processing of documents like
laws/regulations and security standards is what we are going to propose as a
component of the methodology we present in Section 4.
Reified Input/Output Logic. This logic has been designed as an attempt to go
further in state-of-the-art research in legal informatics, by investigating the log-
ical architecture of the provisions, which are available in natural language only.
5 https://info.openlaws.com/openlaws-eu/.
6 http://www.legivoc.eu.
7 http://eucases.eu/start.html.
8 http://www.liviorobaldo.com/Prolemas.htm.
9 http://www.bo-ecli.eu/.
10 http://www.mirelproject.eu/.
11 http://www.akomantoso.org/.
12 http://eurocases.eu/.
Reified Input/Output logic is a logical framework [21] for representing the
meaning of norms. Contrary to the great majority of its competitors [14,16,13],
Reified Input/Output logic integrates modern insights from the NLS literature.
Specifically, it merges Input/Output logic [17], a well-known formalism in De-
ontic Logic (i.e., a logic that expresses concepts like permissions, obligations,
prohibitions), with the first-order logic for NLS proposed by prof. J.R. Hobbs,
which is grounded on the concept of reification. Reification is a concept origi-
nally introduced by the philosopher D. Davidson in [11]. It allows to move from
standard notation in first-order logic such as “(give a b c)”, asserting that “a”
gives “b” to “c”, to another notation in first-order logic “(give e a b c)”, where
“e” is the reification of the giving action. “e” is a first-order logic term denoting
the giving event by “a” of “b” to “c”. Thanks to reification, Hobbs’s logic is able
to express a wide range of phenomena in NLS such as named entities, quan-
tification, anaphora, causality, modality, time, and more13. In particular, the
simplified version of Reified Input/Output logic [21] that we use in our example
is an extension of first-order logic that distinguishes three kinds of implication:
“→”, “ ”, and “⇒”.
The implication “→” is the standard trust-value implication of first-order
logic. The second, “ ”, is its defeasible version. Defeasible [19] here is to be
understood in the sense that an implication “Φ  Ψ” holds by default unless
overridden by “stronger” implications. When instantiated properly, this notion
of “stronger” implications resolves the potential contradictions emerging because
of the non-monotonic nature of the defeasible reasoning. Reified Input/Output
logic also includes other mechanisms to deal with unresolvable conflicts, such as
the well-known conundrum about whether or not Nixon is a pacifist, considering
that he is both a Quaker (therefore pro-peace) and a Republican (pro-war)14. A
possible solution to deal with this type of conflicts is to leave the conflict open
until more evidence will help the reasoner take a decision. This is, actually, what
better fits a situation with conflicts due to multiple legal interpretations. The
third implication, “⇒”, is a deontic implication. Taken a formula Φ, referring to
a set of pre-conditions, and another formula Ψ , referring to a set of actions, the
meaning of “Φ ⇒ Ψ” is “given the pre-condition Φ, actions Ψ are obligatory”,
that is, the actions must be undertaken if the pre-conditions hold. Note that,
according to the interpretation of “⇒”, the formula “Φ⇒ Ψ ∧ Φ ∧ ¬Ψ” is not
inconsistent: it only means obligation Ψ has been violated.
The framework [21] further distinguishes between the formulæ belonging
to the assertive contextual statements (ABox), i.e., the formulæ denoted by
the norms, from those belonging to the terminological declarative statements
(TBox), i.e., the definitions, axioms, and constraints on the predicates used in the
ABox formulæ. Formulæ in the ABox are in the form “∀x1 . . . ∀xn [Φ(x1 . . . xn) ⇒
Ψ(x1 . . . xn) ]”, where arguments “Φ(x1 . . . xn)” and “Ψ(x1 . . . xn)” are conjunc-
13 More information are available on line at the following URLs:
www.isi.edu/~hobbs/csk.html
www.isi.edu/~hobbs/csknowledge-references/csknowledge-references.html.
14 See plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-nonmonotonic/#sec-2-2.
tions in standard first-order logic. Formulæ in the TBox can be any formula in
standard first-order logic augmented with the operator “ ”.
4 Methodology
Our methodology, after minor adaptations, can be applied to find matches be-
tween any laws and any standards. However, in order to explain it in a manner
as precise and specific as possible, we will refer only to a security standard in
ISO/IEC 27000 family, more specifically ISO/IEC 27001, and to the GDPR. The
application example in Section 5 will also refer to these two documents.
4.1 Overview
The methodology we propose is highly interdisciplinary, in that it involves a
strict interaction between law and computer science. When implemented, it will
partition the provisions of the the law into three sets:
set of covered provisions: these are the provisions that have a full match
with the provisions in the standard. A match, or correlation, is expressed in
terms of a logic implication, one of the three implications that the Reified
Input/Output logic admits (for an example seeSection 5);
set of partially-covered provisions: the provisions in this set have a partial
match with provisions in the standard, that is, not all the requirements of the
provision have corresponding elements in the standard. To guarantee com-
pliance with these provisions, the (certified) compliance with the standard
is helpful but not sufficient, and additional requirements must be addressed;
set of uncovered provisions: these are the provisions for which there does
not appear to be any correspondence in the standard. Concerning compli-
ance with these provision, a certified compliance with the standard does not
provide any useful information.
The types of coverage stated above can be further divided into two different
categories: formal and substantive correlations.
Formal correlations entail a mere textual overlap between concepts. For ex-
ample, formal correlations would allow us to observe that both the GDPR and
the ISO/IEC 27001 standard use the term “transfer” (e.g., GDPR, Article 46
and ISO/IEC 27001, Article. 13.2.1, shown in Section 5).
On the other hand, substantive correlations are more complex and entail the
analysis of the actual meaning of terms. To assert a correlation of this kind,
requirements must be met in a concrete way. In other words, and following
the previous example, to assert a correlation between a provision of the GDPR
and one of the standard concerning transfer, it is necessary to verify the actual
difference/similarity in meaning.
It should be pointed out that the correlations that define a match are defea-
sible, i.e., they can be superseded by new correlations. A superseding correlation
might be the consequence of a decision of a court or Data Protection Author-
ity (DPA), or simply the evolution of the interpretation in doctrinal analysis.
This way, the output of the methodology can be easily kept up to date by intro-
ducing the new correlations as they are developed by the legal actors.
4.2 Building Correlations
To build the correlations and define the types of coverage, the methodology
follows three steps, which involve both a legal and a technical approach. The legal
approach is focused on the interpretation of the provisions of laws (the GDPR
in our example) and security standards, whereas the technical approach consists
of modelling those provisions into an ontology, and expressing the interpretation
by means of logical formulas. The sequence of steps is meant to be iteratively
repeated. At each iteration, existing correlations between provisions in the law
and provisions in the standard are presented to the user, but new correlations
may be established and existing correlations may be updated. The knowledge
base of correlations is thus used and updated at the same time.
The next paragraphs detail the steps.
Step 1: analysis of the provisions. The provisions of the law and of the security
standard are analyzed by legal experts. They provide a legal interpretation of the
terms used in the provisions and compare them in search of semantic correlation.
There is no need for this interpretation to be final—more interpretations can be
added later, and old interpretations can be overridden by newer ones—but this
start requires a significant manual activity. The analysis also builds a structured
model of the provisions, using an annotation tool called LIME15. LIME does not
modify the text of the law, but splits it into its components, i.e., articles, para-
graphs, and so on. This annotation converts the law and the security standard
into the XML legal format Akoma Ntoso. The latter is a formalism that provides
specific XML tags for linking the textual spans with separate semantic annota-
tions. So, for example, relevant concepts can be embraced by <concept eId=x>
. . . </concept>, where “x” indexes an ontological concept (see next step).
To support the execution of this step (and especially its successive iterations),
we link LIME to external NLP procedures so that it suggests (semi-automatically
and while the legal expert browses the documents) previous translations and
correlations on the basis of the ones currently stored in the knowledge base.
Ultimately, it is the legal expert that must decide whether and how the corre-
lations shown need to be overridden. In that case, together with the updating
of the knowledge base, we can annotate the new correlations with the source
which contributed to define it (e.g., Court of Justice of the European Union,
Dapreco and Copreda Corp., C-XYZ/16). Correlations by more authoritative
sources must override defeasible correlations by less authoritative ones, reshap-
ing the partitions in the three coverage sets as described in Subsection 4.1.
15 http://lime.cirsfid.unibo.it/.
Step 2: creation of legal ontologies. The legal interpretations are mapped onto
legal ontologies of the law and the security standard. Legal ontologies [4] model
the legal concepts, the parties and stakeholders affected by the law, the duties
and rights of each stakeholder, and the sanctions and penalties for violating
the duties. As per ontologies in general, legal ontologies must be expressed in a
knowledge representation language. For this work, we chose the popular abstract
language OWL [1]. It can be serialized using various XML notations, making it
well fit for machine processing. For example, the OWL representation of the data
protection ontology will contain concepts such as “controller”, “data subject”,
“personal data”, “processing” and so on.
Concerning the GDPR used in our example, a preliminary version of a legal
ontology has been defined already [3]. Albeit partial and based on an older text
of the GDPR, it was designed to express the duties of the controller. As such, it
can be used to find the correspondences between the requirements expressed in
the GDPR and in security standards, until an improved ontology is built.
Step 3: generation of logic formulæ. The third and final step of the methodology
consists of generating the logical formulæ representing the set of provisions in the
law and the set of provisions in the security standard, as well as the correlations
between them. These formulæ are expressed in Reified Input/Output logic [21],
the first-order language illustrated above in Section 3.
Associating textual provisions to logical formulæ amounts to converting am-
biguous and vague terms into non-ambiguous items (predicates and terms).
Also, as extensively explained above, these predicates, as well as the correla-
tions connecting them, are subject to different legal interpretations. To this end,
words in the provisions are represented via predicates reflecting their ambigu-
ity/vagueness. For example, the word “appropriate”, included in the sample
GDPR provision used below in Section 5, will be represented via the homonym
predicate “appropriate”. These “vague” predicates may be defined by adding cor-
relations and further constraints (axioms). Those correlations will be defeasible,
so that they can account for different legal interpretations.
5 Generation of Logic Formulæ: example
We exemplify step 3 of our methodology by using a provision from the GDPR
and an article of the ISO/IEC 27001 security standard. Namely:
(a) GDPR, Article 46.1: [. . . ] a controller or processor may transfer personal
data to a third country or an international organization only if the controller
or processor has provided appropriate safeguards [. . . ]
(b) ISO 27001, Article. 13.2.1: Formal transfer policies, procedures and controls
shall be in place to protect the transfer of information through the use of all
types of communication facilities.
We underline that this example is based only on merely formal correlations
between the two texts and relies on the formal conceptual identity of the term
“transfer”. In this paper we did not take into account the substantive interpreta-
tions, according to which the same term would be used with different meanings
in the two contexts. The example has the sole purpose of exposing how formulæ
are build; it does not mean to assess the substantive correlation between the two
texts, which might lead to a different conclusion in terms of compliance.
The formalization of the two provisions in the simplified version of Reified
Input/Output logic we use in this paper is rather straightforward. As explained
above in Section 4.2, the formulæ will include predicates reflecting the vague-
ness of the terms occurring in the sentences. Thus, for instance, the main verb
“transfer” is formalized into an homonym predicate “transfer” and the adjective
“appropriate” is formalized into an homonym predicate “appropriate”.
Note that the sentences may refer to tacit knowledge, i.e., they may con-
tain ellipses. For instance, the GDPR uses the term “data subject” to generi-
cally refer to individuals to which the personal data pertains. However, in many
GDPR provisions, such as the one shown above, it is not specified that the
“personal data” are the “personal data of a data subject”. Tacit knowledge
ought to be restored in the formula; thus we will represent “personal data” as
“(personalData y) ∧ (of y z) ∧ (dataSubject z)”, where “y” is a (generic) unit of
personal data and “z” is the (generic) data subject that owns “y”.
Elliptical/tacit knowledge is only one of the issues we must deal with when
translating natural language into logical formulæ. In this paper, we cannot il-
lustrate all major problems in NLS and how it is possible to address them in a
reification-based framework such as the one of prof. Hobbs.
The GDPR provision in (a) is formalized as follows:
∀e∀x∀y∀z∀w∀k[
( (dataController x) ∧ (personalData y) ∧ (of y z) ∧ (dataSubject z)∧
(thirdCountryOrIntOrgw z) ∧ (transfer e x y w) ∧ (instrOf e k) )
⇒ (appropriate k) ] (1)
In (1), “e” is a first-order variable referring to the event of transfer of “y”
(patient) performed by “x” (agent) to “w” (receiver). “x” has to be a data
controller16 while “y” refers to personal data of a data subject “z”. “k” is the
instrument of the action “e”, i.e., the communication facility through which data
are transferred. The predicate “thirdCountryOrIntOrg” is a convenient predicate
to state that its first argument is either an international organization or a country
different from the one where the data subject lives. This is enforced by adding
the following definition of “thirdCountryOrIntOrg” to the TBox:
∀w∀y∀c[ (thirdCountryOrIntOrgw z) ↔
( (IntOrgw) ∨ ( (countryw) ∧ (diffFromw c) ∧ (countryOf c z) ) ) ] (2)
16 Or a data processor, but in this example we assume for simplicity that the provision
only refers to data controllers.
The crucial predicate in (1) is the predicate “appropriate”, which may be true
or false with respect to a communication facility “k”.
The TBox of the ontology will include defeasible axioms that define when a
communication facility is “appropriate”. For instance, an undertaking certified
to ISO 27001 has adopted a formal transfer policy according to which data
transfers must take place via email with electronic signature or registered (hard)
mail. Assuming that such data transfers are to be considered appropriate, the
following two (defeasible) axioms are added to the knowledge base.
∀x[ (emailWithESx)  (appropriatex) ],
∀x[ (regMailx)  (appropriatex) ] (3)
In case a judicial authority decides, for example, that emails are no longer ap-
propriate means, an additional higher-priority axiom will be added to the TBox
in order to override the first axiom in (3). However, axioms may be associated
to time stamps (although this is not shown in (3), so that the new axiom will
override the old one only for transfer actions performed after a certain date, i.e.,
the one from which the new law enters into force. On the other hand, the old
axiom will still assert that email with electronic signature is an “appropriate”
communication facility for all transfer actions performed before that date.
Formula (4) models the ISO/IEC 27001 provision in (b). This provision refers
to any kind of information, not only personal data. It does not specify the agent
or the receiver of the transfer actions, so those are assumed to be any entity.
The formal transfer policies, procedures and controls to protect the transfer of
information are simply formalized in terms of a predicate secure, which is true
for any communication facility that is deemed to be “secure”.
∀e∀x∀y∀w∀k[
( (transfer e x y w) ∧ (information y) ∧ (instrOf e k) )
⇒ (secure k) ] (4)
Since personal data are a particular subclass of information, the TBox in-
cludes the following axiom:
∀y[ (personalData y) → (information y) ] (5)
On the other hand, since in (4) the agent and the receiver may be any entity,
the formula may be obviously evaluated also when these are data controllers and
third countries or international organizations.
So far, the example serves the purpose of illustrating how formal correlations
work. To take it one step further we would have to assume a substantive cor-
relation between the terms in the two norms. This would mean that transfer is
used in the two text with the same meaning. Under this hypothesis, if there is a
legal interpretation stating that whenever a means of communication is “secure”
with respect to the ISO/IEC 27001 standard, then it is “appropriate” for trans-
ferring personal data with respect to the GDPR, such an interpretation can be
expressed as shown in (6).
∀k[ (secure k)  (appropriate k) ] (6)
Based on such an interpretation, it would then be possible to automatically
infer that, whenever the ISO/IEC 27001 standard is respected by an agent “x”,
so is (part of) the corresponding GDPR’s provision.
Again, the correlation formalized in axiom (6) is defeasible. In case a court
or a data protection authority later decides that not all secure communication
facilities are appropriate from the point of view of provision (a), it is possible
to add further higher-priority axioms to the knowledge base in order to override
(6), thus keeping track of that specific legal interpretation.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper introduces a semi-automated methodology to reuse existing security
standards to help ensure legal compliance. By following the illustrated method-
ology, one can build a machine-processable knowledge base of logic formulæ that
model relevant concepts from the text of a law and a security standard, together
with their possible correlations. Once the knowledge base has been populated
with a sufficient number of correlations, since standards can be certified by au-
ditors, an enterprise that implements the standard can have an argument for
compliance, at least with the provisions to which the standard correlates.
The knowledge base will thus allow to detect the legal provisions covered by
the standard, and can then be used to assess to what extent the enterprise that
has implemented the standard(s) complies with the law.
Although this paper focuses on the methodology only, several technical chal-
lenges related to building and updating the knowledge base are raised.
First off, the translations from natural language to logical formulæ must be
uniform for excerpts of text that are similar to each other. To achieve this, we
must overcome the limitation of a manual translation, which would be time-
consuming and error-prone. For this reason, our work must rely on current NLP
technologies. However, even at the best of their performances, NLP algorithms
are still unable to automatically carry out the translation with a reasonable level
of accuracy, so we advocate a semi-automatic translation of the provisions.
Similar approaches are applied to translations in general. Here, translators
are helped by collaborative tools such as the “SDL Trados Studio”17, which
suggests, via pattern-recognition text-similarity NLP techniques [18,9], how to
translate a sentence on the basis of the translations of similar sentences that
the translators have previously stored in the tool. Using a feature used in tools
17 http://www.translationzone.com/products/trados-studio/.
to learn foreign languages such as Duolingo18, some translations acquire more
importance the more they are chosen by highly-qualified end users.
Inspired by that approach, we will extend the LIME text editor to assist the
manual translation of provisions into formulæ. For each provision, the editor will
display the translations of similar provisions found via NLP procedures applied
to the provisions already stored in the knowledge base.
Secondly, the knowledge base must be consistent, i.e., without contradictions.
To check for consistency, we plan to store formulæ in an XML-based data model,
and employ/extend reasoners19, to monitor the consistency of the knowledge
base, whenever new formulæ are added to it.
The methodology herein is currently a work in progress and not fully im-
plemented yet. The complete methodology requires the definition of a detailed
taxonomy of concepts extracted from the law and the security standards.
In the future, we envision significant developments of the research presented
in this paper. The knowledge base will be populated with legal interpretations
that will be translated into defeasible formulæ. To this end, and along the GDPR
example, web crawlers can be used to parse documents from relevant portals,
e.g., those of national DPAs in the EU, in order to check (via NLP) whether new
interpretations of the GDPR provisions are available. The knowledge engineers
can then update the knowledge base, overriding some defeasible implications
occurring therein. This task can be more easily achieved if the the methodology
and the techniques we have illustrated here are embedded in a web service. By
accessing the service, users, such as legal experts, judicial courts and the like,
will benefit from the collaborative expertise brought by the knowledge base; at
the same time, they can help build and update the substantive correlations. In
addition to the technical skills needed to manage the knowledge base, this step
would greatly benefit from a close interaction with legal authorities. We envision
that in a small country like Luxembourg that could be more easily achieved.
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